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Success in the quest for artificial intelligence has the potential to bring unprecedented benefits to
humanity, and it is therefore worthwhile to investigate how to maximize these benefits while avoiding
potential pitfalls. This article gives numerous examples (which should by no means be construed
as an exhaustive list) of such worthwhile research aimed at ensuring that AI remains robust and
beneficial.
Artificial intelligence (AI) research has explored a va-
riety of problems and approaches since its inception, but
for the last 20 years or so has been focused on the prob-
lems surrounding the construction of intelligent agents –
systems that perceive and act in some environment. In
this context, the criterion for intelligence is related to sta-
tistical and economic notions of rationality – colloquially,
the ability to make good decisions, plans, or inferences.
The adoption of probabilistic representations and statis-
tical learning methods has led to a large degree of inte-
gration and cross-fertilization between AI, machine learn-
ing, statistics, control theory, neuroscience, and other
fields. The establishment of shared theoretical frame-
works, combined with the availability of data and pro-
cessing power, has yielded remarkable successes in vari-
ous component tasks such as speech recognition, image
classification, autonomous vehicles, machine translation,
legged locomotion, and question-answering systems.
As capabilities in these areas and others cross the
threshold from laboratory research to economically valu-
able technologies, a virtuous cycle takes hold whereby
even small improvements in performance are worth large
sums of money, prompting greater investments in re-
search. There is now a broad consensus that AI research
is progressing steadily, and that its impact on society is
likely to increase. The potential benefits are huge, since
everything that civilization has to offer is a product of
human intelligence; we cannot predict what we might
achieve when this intelligence is magnified by the tools AI
may provide, but the eradication of disease and poverty
are not unfathomable. Because of the great potential of
AI, it is valuable to investigate how to reap its benefits
while avoiding potential pitfalls.
Progress in AI research makes it timely to focus re-
search not only on making AI more capable, but also on
maximizing the societal benefit of AI. Such considera-
tions motivated the AAAI 2008–09 Presidential Panel on
Long-Term AI Futures [1] and other projects and com-
munity efforts on AI’s future impacts. These constitute
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a significant expansion of the field of AI itself, which up
to now has focused largely on techniques that are neutral
with respect to purpose. The present document can be
viewed as a natural continuation of these efforts, focusing
on identifying research directions that can help maximize
the societal benefit of AI. This research is by necessity
interdisciplinary, because it involves both society and AI.
It ranges from economics, law, and philosophy to com-
puter security, formal methods and, of course, various
branches of AI itself. The focus is on delivering AI that
is beneficial to society and robust in the sense that the
benefits are guaranteed: our AI systems must do what
we want them to do.
This document was drafted with input from the atten-
dees of the 2015 conference “The Future of AI: Oppor-
tunities and Challenges”1 (see Acknowledgements), and
was the basis for an open letter that has collected over
8,000 signatures in support of the research priorities out-
lined here.
I. SHORT-TERM RESEARCH PRIORITIES
A. Optimizing AI’s Economic Impact
The successes of industrial applications of AI, from
manufacturing to information services, demonstrate a
growing impact on the economy, although there is dis-
agreement about the exact nature of this impact and on
how to distinguish between the effects of AI and those
of other information technologies. Many economists and
computer scientists agree that there is valuable research
to be done on how to maximize the economic benefits of
AI while mitigating adverse effects, which could include
increased inequality and unemployment [2–8]. Such con-
siderations motivate a range of research directions, span-
ning areas from economics to psychology. Below are a
few examples that should by no means be interpreted as
an exhaustive list.
1 More details about the conference, including many of the talks,
are available at http://tinyurl.com/beneficialai.
21. Labor market forecasting: When and in what
order should we expect various jobs to become au-
tomated [4]? How will this affect the wages of less
skilled workers, the creative professions, and differ-
ent kinds of information workers? Some have have
argued that AI is likely to greatly increase the over-
all wealth of humanity as a whole [3]. However,
increased automation may push income distribu-
tion further towards a power law [9], and the re-
sulting disparity may fall disproportionately along
lines of race, class, and gender; research anticipat-
ing the economic and societal impact of such dis-
parity could be useful.
2. Other market disruptions: Significant parts of
the economy, including finance, insurance, actuar-
ial, and many consumer markets, could be suscepti-
ble to disruption through the use of AI techniques
to learn, model, and predict human and market
behaviors. These markets might be identified by a
combination of high complexity and high rewards
for navigating that complexity [8].
3. Policy for managing adverse effects: What
policies could help increasingly automated societies
flourish? For example, Brynjolfsson and McAfee
[3] explore various policies for incentivizing de-
velopment of labor-intensive sectors and for us-
ing AI-generated wealth to support underemployed
populations. What are the pros and cons of in-
terventions such as educational reform, appren-
ticeship programs, labor-demanding infrastructure
projects, and changes to minimum wage law, tax
structure, and the social safety net [5]? His-
tory provides many examples of subpopulations not
needing to work for economic security, ranging from
aristocrats in antiquity to many present-day citi-
zens of Qatar. What societal structures and other
factors determine whether such populations flour-
ish? Unemployment is not the same as leisure,
and there are deep links between unemployment
and unhappiness, self-doubt, and isolation [10, 11];
understanding what policies and norms can break
these links could significantly improve the median
quality of life. Empirical and theoretical research
on topics such as the basic income proposal could
clarify our options [12, 13].
4. Economic measures: It is possible that economic
measures such as real GDP per capita do not ac-
curately capture the benefits and detriments of
heavily AI-and-automation-based economies, mak-
ing these metrics unsuitable for policy purposes [2].
Research on improved metrics could be useful for
decision-making.
B. Law and Ethics Research
The development of systems that embody significant
amounts of intelligence and autonomy leads to impor-
tant legal and ethical questions whose answers impact
both producers and consumers of AI technology. These
questions span law, public policy, professional ethics, and
philosophical ethics, and will require expertise from com-
puter scientists, legal experts, political scientists, and
ethicists. For example:
1. Liability and law for autonomous vehicles:
If self-driving cars cut the roughly 40,000 annual
US traffic fatalities in half, the car makers might
get not 20,000 thank-you notes, but 20,000 law-
suits. In what legal framework can the safety
benefits of autonomous vehicles such as drone air-
craft and self-driving cars best be realized [14]?
Should legal questions about AI be handled by ex-
isting (software- and internet-focused) “cyberlaw”,
or should they be treated separately [15]? In both
military and commercial applications, governments
will need to decide how best to bring the relevant
expertise to bear; for example, a panel or commit-
tee of professionals and academics could be created,
and Calo has proposed the creation of a Federal
Robotics Commission [16].
2. Machine ethics: How should an autonomous ve-
hicle trade off, say, a small probability of injury
to a human against the near-certainty of a large
material cost? How should lawyers, ethicists, and
policymakers engage the public on these issues?
Should such trade-offs be the subject of national
standards?
3. Autonomous weapons: Can lethal autonomous
weapons be made to comply with humanitarian
law [17]? If, as some organizations have suggested,
autonomous weapons should be banned [18], is it
possible to develop a precise definition of auton-
omy for this purpose, and can such a ban practi-
cally be enforced? If it is permissible or legal to
use lethal autonomous weapons, how should these
weapons be integrated into the existing command-
and-control structure so that responsibility and li-
ability remain associated with specific human ac-
tors? What technical realities and forecasts should
inform these questions, and how should “meaning-
ful human control” over weapons be defined [19–
21]? Are autonomous weapons likely to reduce po-
litical aversion to conflict, or perhaps result in “ac-
cidental” battles or wars [22]? Would such weapons
become the tool of choice for oppressors or terror-
ists? Finally, how can transparency and public dis-
course best be encouraged on these issues?
4. Privacy: How should the ability of AI systems
to interpret the data obtained from surveillance
3cameras, phone lines, emails, etc., interact with
the right to privacy? How will privacy risks inter-
act with cybersecurity and cyberwarfare [23]? Our
ability to take full advantage of the synergy be-
tween AI and big data will depend in part on our
ability to manage and preserve privacy [24, 25].
5. Professional ethics: What role should computer
scientists play in the law and ethics of AI develop-
ment and use? Past and current projects to explore
these questions include the AAAI 2008–09 Presi-
dential Panel on Long-Term AI Futures [1], the EP-
SRC Principles of Robotics [26], and recently an-
nounced programs such as Stanford’s One-Hundred
Year Study of AI and the AAAI Committee on AI
Impact and Ethical Issues.
From a public policy perspective, AI (like any power-
ful new technology) enables both great new benefits and
novel pitfalls to be avoided, and appropriate policies can
ensure that we can enjoy the benefits while risks are min-
imized. This raises policy questions such as these:
1. What is the space of policies worth studying, and
how might they be enacted?
2. Which criteria should be used to determine the
merits of a policy? Candidates include verifiability
of compliance, enforceability, ability to reduce risk,
ability to avoid stifling desirable technology de-
velopment, adoptability, and ability to adapt over
time to changing circumstances.
C. Computer Science Research for Robust AI
As autonomous systems become more prevalent in so-
ciety, it becomes increasingly important that they ro-
bustly behave as intended. The development of au-
tonomous vehicles, autonomous trading systems, au-
tonomous weapons, etc. has therefore stoked interest in
high-assurance systems where strong robustness guaran-
tees can be made; Weld and Etzioni have argued that “so-
ciety will reject autonomous agents unless we have some
credible means of making them safe” [27]. Different ways
in which an AI system may fail to perform as desired
correspond to different areas of robustness research:
1. Verification: how to prove that a system satisfies
certain desired formal properties. (“Did I build the
system right?”)
2. Validity: how to ensure that a system that meets
its formal requirements does not have unwanted be-
haviors and consequences. (“Did I build the right
system?”)
3. Security: how to prevent intentional manipulation
by unauthorized parties.
4. Control: how to enable meaningful human control
over an AI system after it begins to operate. (“OK,
I built the system wrong; can I fix it?”)
1. Verification
By verification, we mean methods that yield high con-
fidence that a system will satisfy a set of formal con-
straints. When possible, it is desirable for systems in
safety-critical situations, e.g. self-driving cars, to be ver-
ifiable.
Formal verification of software has advanced signifi-
cantly in recent years: examples include the seL4 ker-
nel [28], a complete, general-purpose operating-system
kernel that has been mathematically checked against a
formal specification to give a strong guarantee against
crashes and unsafe operations, and HACMS, DARPA’s
“clean-slate, formal methods-based approach” to a set of
high-assurance software tools [29]. Not only should it
be possible to build AI systems on top of verified sub-
strates; it should also be possible to verify the designs
of the AI systems themselves, particularly if they fol-
low a “componentized architecture”, in which guarantees
about individual components can be combined accord-
ing to their connections to yield properties of the over-
all system. This mirrors the agent architectures used in
Russell and Norvig (2010), which separate an agent into
distinct modules (predictive models, state estimates, util-
ity functions, policies, learning elements, etc.), and has
analogues in some formal results on control system de-
signs. Research on richer kinds of agents – for example,
agents with layered architectures, anytime components,
overlapping deliberative and reactive elements, metalevel
control, etc. – could contribute to the creation of verifi-
able agents, but we lack the formal “algebra” to properly
define, explore, and rank the space of designs.
Perhaps the most salient difference between verifica-
tion of traditional software and verification of AI sys-
tems is that the correctness of traditional software is de-
fined with respect to a fixed and known machine model,
whereas AI systems – especially robots and other em-
bodied systems – operate in environments that are at
best partially known by the system designer. In these
cases, it may be practical to verify that the system acts
correctly given the knowledge that it has, avoiding the
problem of modelling the real environment [30]. A lack
of design-time knowledge also motivates the use of learn-
ing algorithms within the agent software, and verification
becomes more difficult: statistical learning theory gives
so-called ǫ-δ (probably approximately correct) bounds,
mostly for the somewhat unrealistic settings of super-
vised learning from i.i.d. data and single-agent reinforce-
ment learning with simple architectures and full observ-
ability, but even then requiring prohibitively large sample
sizes to obtain meaningful guarantees.
Work in adaptive control theory [31], the theory of
so-called cyberphysical systems [32], and verification of
4hybrid or robotic systems [33, 34] is highly relevant but
also faces the same difficulties. And of course all these
issues are laid on top of the standard problem of proving
that a given software artifact does in fact correctly im-
plement, say, a reinforcement learning algorithm of the
intended type. Some work has been done on verifying
neural network applications [35–37] and the notion of
partial programs [38, 39] allows the designer to impose
arbitrary “structural” constraints on behavior, but much
remains to be done before it will be possible to have high
confidence that a learning agent will learn to satisfy its
design criteria in realistic contexts.
2. Validity
A verification theorem for an agent design has the
form, “If environment satisfies assumptions φ then be-
havior satisfies requirements ψ.” There are two ways
in which a verified agent can, nonetheless, fail to be a
beneficial agent in actuality: first, the environmental as-
sumption φ is false in the real world, leading to behavior
that violates the requirements ψ; second, the system may
satisfy the formal requirement ψ but still behave in ways
that we find highly undesirable in practice. It may be the
case that this undesirability is a consequence of satisfying
ψ when φ is violated; i.e., had φ held the undesirability
would not have been manifested; or it may be the case
that the requirement ψ is erroneous in itself. Russell
and Norvig (2010) provide a simple example: if a robot
vacuum cleaner is asked to clean up as much dirt as pos-
sible, and has an action to dump the contents of its dirt
container, it will repeatedly dump and clean up the same
dirt. The requirement should focus not on dirt cleaned up
but on cleanliness of the floor. Such specification errors
are ubiquitous in software verification, where it is com-
monly observed that writing correct specifications can be
harder than writing correct code. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to verify the specification: the notions of “ben-
eficial” and “desirable” are not separately made formal,
so one cannot straightforwardly prove that satisfying ψ
necessarily leads to desirable behavior and a beneficial
agent.
In order to build systems that robustly behave well, we
of course need to decide what “good behavior” means in
each application domain. This ethical question is tied in-
timately to questions of what engineering techniques are
available, how reliable these techniques are, and what
trade-offs can be made – all areas where computer sci-
ence, machine learning, and broader AI expertise is valu-
able. For example, Wallach and Allen (2008) argue that
a significant consideration is the computational expense
of different behavioral standards (or ethical theories): if
a standard cannot be applied efficiently enough to guide
behavior in safety-critical situations, then cheaper ap-
proximations may be needed. Designing simplified rules
– for example, to govern a self-driving car’s decisions in
critical situations – will likely require expertise from both
ethicists and computer scientists. Computational models
of ethical reasoning may shed light on questions of com-
putational expense and the viability of reliable ethical
reasoning methods [40, 41].
3. Security
Security research can help make AI more robust. As
AI systems are used in an increasing number of criti-
cal roles, they will take up an increasing proportion of
cyber-attack surface area. It is also probable that AI
and machine learning techniques will themselves be used
in cyber-attacks.
Robustness against exploitation at the low level is
closely tied to verifiability and freedom from bugs. For
example, the DARPA SAFE program aims to build an in-
tegrated hardware-software system with a flexible meta-
data rule engine, on which can be built memory safety,
fault isolation, and other protocols that could improve
security by preventing exploitable flaws [42]. Such pro-
grams cannot eliminate all security flaws (since verifica-
tion is only as strong as the assumptions that underly
the specification), but could significantly reduce vulner-
abilities of the type exploited by the recent “Heartbleed”
and “Bash” bugs. Such systems could be preferentially
deployed in safety-critical applications, where the cost of
improved security is justified.
At a higher level, research into specific AI and ma-
chine learning techniques may become increasingly use-
ful in security. These techniques could be applied to the
detection of intrusions [43], analyzing malware [44], or
detecting potential exploits in other programs through
code analysis [45]. It is not implausible that cyberattack
between states and private actors will be a risk factor for
harm from near-future AI systems, motivating research
on preventing harmful events. As AI systems grow more
complex and are networked together, they will have to
intelligently manage their trust, motivating research on
statistical-behavioral trust establishment [46] and com-
putational reputation models [47].
4. Control
For certain types of safety-critical AI systems – espe-
cially vehicles and weapons platforms – it may be desir-
able to retain some form of meaningful human control,
whether this means a human in the loop, on the loop
[48, 49], or some other protocol. In any of these cases,
there will be technical work needed in order to ensure
that meaningful human control is maintained [50].
Automated vehicles are a test-bed for effective control-
granting techniques. The design of systems and protocols
for transition between automated navigation and human
control is a promising area for further research. Such
issues also motivate broader research on how to opti-
mally allocate tasks within human–computer teams, both
5for identifying situations where control should be trans-
ferred, and for applying human judgment efficiently to
the highest-value decisions.
II. LONG-TERM RESEARCH PRIORITIES
A frequently discussed long-term goal of some AI re-
searchers is to develop systems that can learn from expe-
rience with human-like breadth and surpass human per-
formance in most cognitive tasks, thereby having a major
impact on society. If there is a non-negligible probability
that these efforts will succeed in the foreseeable future,
then additional current research beyond that mentioned
in the previous sections will be motivated as exemplified
below, to help ensure that the resulting AI will be robust
and beneficial.
Assessments of this success probability vary widely be-
tween researchers, but few would argue with great con-
fidence that the probability is negligible, given the track
record of such predictions. For example, Ernest Ruther-
ford, arguably the greatest nuclear physicist of his time,
said in 1933 – less than 24 hours before Szilard’s inven-
tion of the nuclear chain reaction – that nuclear energy
was “moonshine” [51], and Astronomer Royal Richard
Woolley called interplanetary travel “utter bilge” in 1956
[52]. Moreover, to justify a modest investment in this AI
robustness research, this probability need not be high,
merely non-negligible, just as a modest investment in
home insurance is justified by a non-negligible probabil-
ity of the home burning down.
A. Verification
Reprising the themes of short-term research, research
enabling verifiable low-level software and hardware can
eliminate large classes of bugs and problems in general
AI systems; if such systems become increasingly pow-
erful and safety-critical, verifiable safety properties will
become increasingly valuable. If the theory of extend-
ing verifiable properties from components to entire sys-
tems is well understood, then even very large systems
can enjoy certain kinds of safety guarantees, potentially
aided by techniques designed explicitly to handle learning
agents and high-level properties. Theoretical research,
especially if it is done explicitly with very general and
capable AI systems in mind, could be particularly useful.
A related verification research topic that is distinctive
to long-term concerns is the verifiability of systems that
modify, extend, or improve themselves, possibly many
times in succession [53, 54]. Attempting to straightfor-
wardly apply formal verification tools to this more gen-
eral setting presents new difficulties, including the chal-
lenge that a formal system that is sufficiently powerful
cannot use formal methods in the obvious way to gain
assurance about the accuracy of functionally similar for-
mal systems, on pain of inconsistency via Go¨del’s incom-
pleteness [55, 56]. It is not yet clear whether or how
this problem can be overcome, or whether similar prob-
lems will arise with other verification methods of similar
strength.
Finally, it is often difficult to actually apply formal ver-
ification techniques to physical systems, especially sys-
tems that have not been designed with verification in
mind. This motivates research pursuing a general the-
ory that links functional specification to physical states
of affairs. This type of theory would allow use of for-
mal tools to anticipate and control behaviors of systems
that approximate rational agents, alternate designs such
as satisficing agents, and systems that cannot be eas-
ily described in the standard agent formalism (powerful
prediction systems, theorem-provers, limited-purpose sci-
ence or engineering systems, etc.). It may also be that
such a theory could allow rigorous demonstrations that
systems are constrained from taking certain kinds of ac-
tions or performing certain kinds of reasoning.
B. Validity
As in the short-term research priorities, validity is con-
cerned with undesirable behaviors that can arise despite
a system’s formal correctness. In the long term, AI sys-
tems might become more powerful and autonomous, in
which case failures of validity could carry correspondingly
higher costs.
Strong guarantees for machine learning methods, an
area we highlighted for short-term validity research, will
also be important for long-term safety. To maximize the
long-term value of this work, machine learning research
might focus on the types of unexpected generalization
that would be most problematic for very general and ca-
pable AI systems. In particular, it might aim to under-
stand theoretically and practically how learned represen-
tations of high-level human concepts could be expected
to generalize (or fail to) in radically new contexts [57].
Additionally, if some concepts could be learned reliably,
it might be possible to use them to define tasks and con-
straints that minimize the chances of unintended conse-
quences even when autonomous AI systems become very
general and capable. Little work has been done on this
topic, which suggests that both theoretical and experi-
mental research may be useful.
Mathematical tools such as formal logic, probability,
and decision theory have yielded significant insight into
the foundations of reasoning and decision-making. How-
ever, there are still many open problems in the founda-
tions of reasoning and decision. Solutions to these prob-
lems may make the behavior of very capable systems
much more reliable and predictable. Example research
topics in this area include reasoning and decision un-
der bounded computational resources a` la Horvitz and
Russell [58, 59], how to take into account correlations
between AI systems’ behaviors and those of their envi-
ronments or of other agents [60–64], how agents that are
6embedded in their environments should reason [65, 66],
and how to reason about uncertainty over logical con-
sequences of beliefs or other deterministic computations
[67]. These topics may benefit from being considered to-
gether, since they appear deeply linked [68, 69].
In the long term, it is plausible that we will want
to make agents that act autonomously and powerfully
across many domains. Explicitly specifying our prefer-
ences in broad domains in the style of near-future ma-
chine ethics may not be practical, making “aligning” the
values of powerful AI systems with our own values and
preferences difficult [70, 71]. Consider, for instance, the
difficulty of creating a utility function that encompasses
an entire body of law; even a literal rendition of the law is
far beyond our current capabilities, and would be highly
unsatisfactory in practice (since law is written assuming
that it will be interpreted and applied in a flexible, case-
by-case way by humans who, presumably, already em-
body the background value systems that artificial agents
may lack). Reinforcement learning raises its own prob-
lems: when systems become very capable and general,
then an effect similar to Goodhart’s Law is likely to oc-
cur, in which sophisticated agents attempt to manipulate
or directly control their reward signals [72]. This moti-
vates research areas that could improve our ability to
engineer systems that can learn or acquire values at run-
time. For example, inverse reinforcement learning may
offer a viable approach, in which a system infers the pref-
erences of another rational or nearly rational actor by ob-
serving its behavior [73, 74]. Other approaches could use
different assumptions about underlying cognitive models
of the actor whose preferences are being learned [75], or
could be explicitly inspired by the way humans acquire
ethical values. As systems become more capable, more
epistemically difficult methods could become viable, sug-
gesting that research on such methods could be useful;
for example, Bostrom (2014) reviews preliminary work
on a variety of methods for specifying goals indirectly.
C. Security
It is unclear whether long-term progress in AI will
make the overall problem of security easier or harder;
on one hand, systems will become increasingly complex
in construction and behavior and AI-based cyberattacks
may be extremely effective, while on the other hand, the
use of AI and machine learning techniques along with sig-
nificant progress in low-level system reliability may ren-
der hardened systems much less vulnerable than today’s.
From a cryptographic perspective, it appears that this
conflict favors defenders over attackers; this may be a
reason to pursue effective defense research wholeheart-
edly.
Although the topics described in the near-term security
research section above may become increasingly impor-
tant in the long term, very general and capable systems
will pose distinctive security problems. In particular, if
the problems of validity and control are not solved, it may
be useful to create “containers” for AI systems that could
have undesirable behaviors and consequences in less con-
trolled environments [76]. Both theoretical and practical
sides of this question warrant investigation. If the gen-
eral case of AI containment turns out to be prohibitively
difficult, then it may be that designing an AI system
and a container in parallel is more successful, allowing
the weaknesses and strengths of the design to inform the
containment strategy [72]. The design of anomaly detec-
tion systems and automated exploit-checkers could be of
significant help. Overall, it seems reasonable to expect
this additional perspective – defending against attacks
from “within” a system as well as from external actors –
will raise interesting and profitable questions in the field
of computer security.
D. Control
It has been argued that very general and capable AI
systems operating autonomously to accomplish some task
will often be subject to effects that increase the difficulty
of maintaining meaningful human control [6, 72, 77, 78].
Research on systems that are not subject to these ef-
fects, minimize their impact, or allow for reliable human
control could be valuable in preventing undesired conse-
quences, as could work on reliable and secure test-beds
for AI systems at a variety of capability levels.
If an AI system is selecting the actions that best allow
it to complete a given task, then avoiding conditions that
prevent the system from continuing to pursue the task is
a natural subgoal [77, 78] (and conversely, seeking uncon-
strained situations is sometimes a useful heuristic [79]).
This could become problematic, however, if we wish to
repurpose the system, to deactivate it, or to significantly
alter its decision-making process; such a system would
rationally avoid these changes. Systems that do not ex-
hibit these behaviors have been termed corrigible systems
[80], and both theoretical and practical work in this area
appears tractable and useful. For example, it may be
possible to design utility functions or decision processes
so that a system will not try to avoid being shut down
or repurposed [80], and theoretical frameworks could be
developed to better understand the space of potential
systems that avoid undesirable behaviors [81–83].
It has been argued that another natural subgoal for AI
systems pursuing a given goal is the acquisition of fun-
gible resources of a variety of kinds: for example, infor-
mation about the environment, safety from disruption,
and improved freedom of action are all instrumentally
useful for many tasks [77, 78]. Hammond et al (1995)
gives the label stabilization to the more general set of
cases where “due to the action of the agent, the environ-
ment comes to be better fitted to the agent as time goes
on”. This type of subgoal could lead to undesired con-
sequences, and a better understanding of the conditions
under which resource acquisition or radical stabilization
7is an optimal strategy (or likely to be selected by a given
system) would be useful in mitigating its effects. Poten-
tial research topics in this area include “domestic” goals
that are limited in scope in some way [72], the effects
of large temporal discount rates on resource acquisition
strategies, and experimental investigation of simple sys-
tems that display these subgoals.
Finally, research on the possibility of superintelligent
machines or rapid, sustained self-improvement (“intelli-
gence explosion”) has been highlighted by past and cur-
rent projects on the future of AI as potentially valuable
to the project of maintaining reliable control in the long
term. The AAAI 2008–09 Presidential Panel on Long-
Term AI Futures’ “Subgroup on Pace, Concerns, and
Control” stated that
There was overall skepticism about the
prospect of an intelligence explosion... Nev-
ertheless, there was a shared sense that addi-
tional research would be valuable on methods
for understanding and verifying the range of
behaviors of complex computational systems
to minimize unexpected outcomes. Some
panelists recommended that more research
needs to be done to better define “intelli-
gence explosion,” and also to better formu-
late different classes of such accelerating in-
telligences. Technical work would likely lead
to enhanced understanding of the likelihood
of such phenomena, and the nature, risks,
and overall outcomes associated with differ-
ent conceived variants [1].
Stanford’s One-Hundred Year Study of Artificial Intel-
ligence includes “Loss of Control of AI systems” as an
area of study, specifically highlighting concerns over the
possibility that
...we could one day lose control of AI systems
via the rise of superintelligences that do not
act in accordance with human wishes – and
that such powerful systems would threaten
humanity. Are such dystopic outcomes pos-
sible? If so, how might these situations
arise? ...What kind of investments in research
should be made to better understand and to
address the possibility of the rise of a danger-
ous superintelligence or the occurrence of an
“intelligence explosion”? [84]
Research in this area could include any of the long-term
research priorities listed above, as well as theoretical and
forecasting work on intelligence explosion and superin-
telligence [72, 85], and could extend or critique existing
approaches begun by groups such as the Machine Intel-
ligence Research Institute [71].
III. CONCLUSION
In summary, success in the quest for artificial intelli-
gence has the potential to bring unprecedented benefits
to humanity, and it is therefore worthwhile to research
how to maximize these benefits while avoiding potential
pitfalls. The research agenda outlined in this paper, and
the concerns that motivate it, have been called “anti-
AI”, but we vigorously contest this characterization. It
seems self-evident that the growing capabilities of AI are
leading to an increased potential for impact on human
society. It is the duty of AI researchers to ensure that
the future impact is beneficial. We believe that this is
possible, and hope that this research agenda provides a
helpful step in the right direction.
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